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CHANGE OF THE WISCONSIN COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE IN MULTI-DEFENDANT
SUITS: May v. Skelly Oil Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1931 Wisconsin has utilized the tort doctrine of com-
parative negligence in determining the initial liability, and ul-
timate recovery, of negligently injured individuals against de-
fendant parties. At that time most jurisdictions continued to
adhere to the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence,
thus making the Wisconsin approach somewhat unique. Subse-
quently, nearly two-thirds of the states, as well as the federal
government, acted to ameliorate the harshness of the contribu-
tory negligence doctrine. The two most common forms of com-
parative negligence are known as pure comparative negligence
and modified comparative negligence. Pure comparative negli-
gence abrogates completely all vestiges of contributory negli-
gence and allows a plaintiff to recover irrespective of the degree
of his fault. Modified comparative negligence, on the other
hand, only partially abrogates the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence and permits recoveries in a more limited number of
cases. Depending upon the exact formulation of the rule, a
plaintiff is not barred by his contributory fault unless his fault
is equal to, or exceeds that of the opposing party. Beyond this
point the doctrine of contributory negligence is triggered and
acts as a complete bar to any recovery by the claimant, al-
though his actions may not have been the sole and exclusive
cause of the damages. Since its initiation to comparative negli-
gence, Wisconsin has always had a modified form. Because of
Wisconsin's adherence to the modified approach, problems
have arisen which under a pure comparative negligence sys-
tem, would have been avoided or rendered moot. One such
problem in the application of the modified rule is the case in
which there are multiple defendants and the defendants' negli-
gence exceeds that of the plaintiff, yet individually each is less
negligent than the plaintiff. As an example, if a driver of one
car in a three car collision sues the other drivers, and the jury
apportions the parties' respective negligence as 34% for the
plaintiff, and 33% for each defendant, the first legal issue to be
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resolved before the final outcome of the suit can be determined,
is whether the plaintiff's negligence is to be compared individu-
ally against each defendant's or whether the plaintiff's negli-
gence is to be compared against the aggregate negligence of the
defendants.
In past years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has required an
individual comparison with the result that in the above exam-
ple the plaintiff would be barred from recovery. However, the
supreme court has now indicated its intent to alter this rule
and adopt a combined comparison approach. In May v. Skelly
Oil Co.,' the court stated:
This case is one of many cases which have come before
this court involving multiple party tortfeasors. May urges the
Court to re-examine its interpretation of the comparative
negligence statute. The majority of the court has become
convinced that comparing the negligence of the individual
plaintiff to that of each individual tortfeasor - rather than
comparing the negligence of the individual plaintiff to that
of the combined negligence of the several tortfeasors who
have collectively contributed to plaintiffs injuries - leads to
harsh and unfair results; the majority has further concluded
that this rule of comparative negligence, a court-made doc-
trine, can be changed by court decision. However, in view of
our holding that Indian Head is not negligent, the majority
does not believe that the case at bar is the appropriate one
in which to structure a change in the rule of comparative
negligence in cases involving multiple defendants.2
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the propriety of
this decision and to outline the more immediate and important
effects of the rule's adoption.
II. PROPRIETY OF THE CouRT's ACTIONS
On June 15, 1931, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted chap-
ter 242 of the Laws of 1931. 3 Until this time the doctrine of
strict contributory negligence was operative in the State of
1. 83 Wis. 2d 30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978).
2. Id. at 38-39, 264 N.W.2d at 578 (footnote omitted).
3. 1931 Wis. Laws ch. 242:
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or
in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished by the jury in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
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Wisconsin and acted to completely bar claimants from recover-
ing in every instance wherein their negligence contributed to
their injuries.4 It was thus on the initiative of the Wisconsin
Legislature that Wisconsin adopted the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence.
Shortly after the passage of the bill, its author published an
article which attempted to explain the effect and operation of
the-new law. 5 Mr. Padway's comments dealt specifically with
the various aspects of the new law and in particular with the
application of the statute to instances wherein multiple tort-
feasors were involved. To more clearly explain the operation of
the rule, Padway first applied it to a simple two party situation
and then went on to juxtapose that example to a multiple party
suit. According to the author:
When two [defendants] are sued and contribution is
sought the method [of determining their liability] is as fol-
lows:
If "A" sues "B" and "C," he recover [sic] against both
only in the event each is more negligent than he is. If "C" is
less negligent than "A," then "A" would recover only against
"B." In the event of a claim for contribution between "B"
and "C," there will be equal contribution between these two
in the event it is found each is more negligent than "A." If
only one defendant is more negligent than "A," the other is
absolved from liability. The reason for this is that the party
most negligent cannot obtain contribution from a person
against whom the jury found no liability in favor of the claim-
ant.6
Although the framer of section 331.045 clearly indicated
what he felt was the proper application of the rule in multiple
defendant suits, it was not until sometime later that Professor
Richard Campbell, writing in the 1932 issue of the Wisconsin
Law Review, provided Wisconsin practitioners with some ra-
tionale of why section 331.045 dictated an individual rather
than a combined comparison.7
4. Buchman v. Jeffery, 135 Wis. 448, 115 N.W. 372 (1908); Goldman v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry. & Light, 123 Wis. 168, 101 N.W. 384 (1904); Matteson v. Jackman, 32 Wis.
182 (1873); Chamberlain v. Milwaukee & M.R.R., 7 Wis. 367 (1858).
5. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 MARQ. L. REv. 3 (1931) [hereinafter cited
as Padwayl.
6. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis in original).
7. Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis. L. REV. 222 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as Campbell].
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The general spirit of the 1931 act is opposed to construing the
word "person" to mean "persons." One of the fundamental
characteristics of the statute is its retention of enough of the
individualistic spirit of the common law to deny relief to a
claimant whose negligence is equal to or greater than that of
a person whom he is seeking to hold responsible. This princi-
ple would be disregarded in many cases if the defendants are
treated as a unit for the purpose of determining liability. For
example, if the claimant was guilty of 45% negligence, two
defendants of 25% each and one defendant of 5%, the claim-
ant would recover against all of them.'
Thus the individual comparison rule was a product of deliber-
ate legislative choice. Use of the singular term "person" was
therefore not an oversight, but rather, an intentional and con-
scious decision. Professor Campbell therefore dismissed the
possibility of using section 370.01(2) of the 1931 statutes to
construe the singular term as extending to several persons.9
Section 370.01 at that time was a legislative rule for the con-
struction of statutes which permitted in proper cases the singu-
lar to import the plural and the plural to import the singular.10
By using section 370.01(2), the comparative negligence stat-
ute's term "person" could arguably be read as including a
collection of people or persons. However, because neither the
history nor the nature of the act-indicated that the plural was
intended," Campbell concluded that the individual compari-
8. Id. at 244.
9. Id.
10. Wis. STAT. § 370.01 (1931):
Construction of statutes; rules for. In the construction of the statutes of this
state the following rules shall be observed unless such construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature; that is to say:
(2) SINGULAR AND PLURAL NUMBERS; MALES AND FEMALES. Every word im-
porting the singular number only may extend and be applied to several
persons or things as well as to one person or thing; and every word import-
ing the plural number only may extend and be applied to one person or
thing as well as to several persons or things, and every word importing
the masculine gender only may extend and be applied to females as well
as to males.
11. The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute was originally adopted as Sen-
ate Bill no. 55S. To this bill were proposed two substitute amendments. Each amend-
ment specifically dealt with the issues arising in multi-defendant suits. According to
the amendments,
(4) When there are more than two parties in controversy over negligence, the
one least negligent shall recover his damages from those more negligent, but his
damages shall be decreased by the percentage of his own negligence. The liabil-
ity of each party more negligent shall be for his percentage of negligence.
[Vol. 62:205
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son rule was the only appropriate reading and interpretation of
section. 331.045.12
An additional reason mentioned by Campbell which indi-
rectly supported Padway's construction of section 331.045 was
the fact that the comparative negligence act was in derogation
of the common-law. 3 Being in derogation of the common law,
the act was to be given a strict construction. The rule of com-
bined comparison being essentially a form of pure comparative
negligence" was at greater odds with the common-law doctrine
of contributory negligence, and thus, could not be accepted as
the proper interpretation of the new statute in the absence of
clear and unequivocal language.
Two years after the passage of section 331.045, and with the
benefit of both the Padway and Campbell articles, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court accepted an appeal dealing with the issue
of multiple defendants in a comparative negligence action. In
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.," the court, without
express mention of the Padway or Campbell articles, adopted
Padway's construction of section 331.045 and interpreted the
statute as dictating an individual comparison when determin-
ing the initial liability of each party defendant. According to
the court,
By virtue of section 331.045, Stats., the instances in which
there is a right to recover have been increased in that, even
though there was contributory negligence, recovery is not
barred if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought. If such contri-
butory negligence was as great as the negligence of one of the
(5) When there are more than two parties in controversy over negligence and
there are two or more least negligent in the same degree, each of the least
negligent parties shall recover from each of those more negligent and in each
such case the liability of each party more negligent shall be for his percentage
of negligence.
Senate Bill 55S, Sub. Amends. is & 2s (1931).
Although neither of the amendments ultimately passed, it is interesting to note that
of the three formulations of this statute, not one included language indicating a com-
bined comparison approach. In point of fact, two of the bills expressly prohibited such
a result. Thus it cannot be said that at the time of passage, the legislature was ignorant
of the problem posed by the comparative negligence law to multi-defendant suits.
Evidence from the bills indicates that when the legislature considered the problem,
its response was limited to an individual comparison approach.
12. Campbell, supra note 7, at 244.
13. Id. at 226.
14. Handbook of the*Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Comparative Fault Act 343 (Annual Conf. 1977) (prefatory note).
15. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
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tortfeasors against whom recovery is sought, then as to that
particular tortfeasor there still is no right to recover. That
tortfeasor is out of the picture as far as liability on his part
to the party whose negligence was as great as his is concerned.
On the other hand, from every remaining tortfeasor, whose
negligence was greater than that of the person seeking to
recover, there exists now, by virtue of the statute, a right to
recover, subject, however, to the limitation prescribed by the
statute, that the damages allowed shall be diminished in pro-
portion to the negligence attributable to the person recover-
ing.16
Though the above language was dicta it nevertheless clearly
indicated the court's position on the issue. As can be seen, the
language above comports in all respects to the results which the
statute's author and Professor Campbell thought should have
occurred under the wording of the statute. However, like the
statute's author, the court failed to state on what basis its
construction of the statute rested. Presumably the court relied
upon the fact that the statute employed the singular term
"person" instead of the plural "persons."
In several subsequent cases the supreme court reaffirmed
its Walker interpretation, among which was Schwenn v. Lo-
raine Hotel Co. 17 Schwenn was a slip and fall case in which the
plaintiff jointly sued a cab company and a hotel enterprise for
injuries sustained when the plaintiff fell on the hotel's driveway
while attempting to catch a cab. The supreme court ruled that
the defendants did not owe a common or joint duty to maintain
the driveway and, therefore, the trial court's aggregation of the
defendants' negligence to determine their initial liability was
erroneous. According to the court, the general rule was that
"the comparison of negligence in a multiple defendant case is
required to be between the plaintiff and the individual defen-
dants." 18 Although this general rule was excepted when the
defendants owed a joint duty to the plaintiff, this exception
was found inapplicable to the case at bar. Thus the court held
that the general rule applied and unless each defendant's negli-
gence exceeded that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be
barred from recovery. The court cited Walker as authority for
its ruling and implied that a contrary construction would be
16. Id. at 536, 252 N.W. at 727-28.
17. 14 Wis. 2d 601, 111 N.W.2d 495 (1961).
18. Id. at 609-10, 111 N.W.2d at 500.
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improper' 9 because it would permit a plaintiff to recover from
a defendant less negligent. 0 The court went on to say that it
disbelieved that the legislature could have intended such a
result.2 ' The Schwenn. court also gave some indication of the
source of the individual comparison rule saying that it was
"under" section 331.045, which required that the comparison
be made on an individual basis. Being "under" section 331.045,
the individual comparison rule arose out of the comparative
negligence statute and must have been construed by the court
as intended by the legislature.
The next pertinent development in the history of the com-
parative negligence statute was its amendment on June 23,
1971.22 By virtue of that amendment, section 895.04513 was al-
tered to read that an injured party is not barred by his contri-
butory negligence so long as his negligence does not exceed that
of the person against whom recovery is sought. At the time of
the amendment, the legislature neglected to make any change
in the individual comparison rule. Such a change could have
been implemented by the simple addition of the words "person
or persons against whom recovery is sought," in place of the
phrase "person against whom recovery is sought." The legisla-
ture chose not to do so however and its refusal cannot be ex-
plained or defended on the basis that the legislature was igno-
rant of the rule or of its operation. The individual comparison
rule had been in continuous operation for more than thirty-
seven years, and it is unlikely that the legislature was not cog-
nizant of its existence or application. Furthermore, the fact
that the legislature took it upon itself to revamp and update
the comparative negligence statute militates against such a
conclusion. Thus, there is a strong support for the proposition
that the legislature sanctioned the supreme court's interpreta-
tion of the comparative negligence statute as announced in
Walker.
19. Id. at 610, 111 N.W.2d at 500.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 47.
23. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1971) (emphasis added) reads as follows:
Contributory negligence. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not greater thar the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
1978]
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Following Schwenn and the 1971 amendment, the court
decided the case of Gross v. Denow.2' Although the majority
opinion in Gross did not discuss the desirability or effects of the
individual comparison rule, both the concurring and dissenting
opinions had occasion to raise and discuss the issue. In his
concurrence Justice Wilkie pleaded that the rule was unfair
and asked the legislature to again amend the statute so as to
correct this inequity.2 In calling upon the legislature, Wilkie
remarked that the individual comparison rule was provided for
by the language of the comparative negligence statute. Thus,
according to Wilkie, the individual comparison rule was
rooted in, and arose from, the comparative negligence statute.
Wilkie also made special note of the fact that the legislature
had amended the statute in 1971 and had refrained from alter-
ing the individual comparison rule. Justice Beilfuss joined
Justice Wilkie in this explanation and analysis of section
895.045.
Justice Hallows, on the other hand, dissented from both the
majority ruling and from Wilkie's concurrence." Justice Hal-
lows split sharply with Wilkie on the origin of the individual
comparison rule. According to Hallows, the individual compar-
ison rule was not so much dictated by the language of section
895.045 as it was by stare decisis, and what Hallows argued was
the erroneous construction of the statute in Walker. In his view,
Walker and its progeny were erroneous because these cases
failed to consider the effect of section 990.001(1) or its predeces-
sor on the proper construction of section 895.045. Section
990.0012 is the successor of section 370.01(2)28 and provides
that in construing statutory language the singular imports the
plural and vice versa. Thus, Hallows would read the singular
term "person" in section 895.045 as "the persons against whom
recovery is sought" by power of section 990.001(1). By doing so
a combined comparison approach would result. Hallows also
pointed out that Arkansas, Connecticut, Nevada and Texas all
provided for a combined comparison rule under their compara-
tive negligence statutes.
The introductory sentence to section 990.001 reads:
24. 61 Wis. 2d 40, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973).
25. Id. at 53, 212 N.W.2d at 9-10 (Wilkie, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 54-55, 212 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
27. Wis. STAT. § 990.001(1) (1973).
28. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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In construing Wisconsin laws the following rules shall be ob-
served unless construction in accordance with a rule would
produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature:
(1) SINGULAR AND PLURAL. The singular includes the plural,
and the plural includes the singular.2
As pointed out by both Justice Wilkie in his concurring opinion
in Gross, and by the majority opinion in Schwenn, it specifi-
cally was the intent of the legislature to use the singular rather
than the plural. A reading of the Padway article also makes
clear that it was the intent of the framer that section 331.045
be read as limited to an individual comparison." Being an
intentional choice of words, section 990.001(1) would therefore,
according to its own directives, be inapplicable. Moreover, Hal-
lows' observation that neither Schwenn nor Walker considered
the application of 990.001(1) when construing section 331.045
is undermined by the existence of the Campbell article which
disposed of the very same argument some forty years earlier.
Recall that the Campbell article was written just two years
prior to Walker. Thus, the argument concerning section
990.001 and its predecessor section was in the air when that
seminal case was decided. Instead of explaining the absence
of any reference to the statutory construction rules as an un-
intended oversight by the court, it is much more likely that
the court, aware of the argument, decided not to devote space
to the argument reasoning that it did not warrant comment.
There is one final fact which operates to render inapplicable
section 990.001 to the individual comparison rule. The supreme
court had on at least one occasion, already construed the in-
tent of section 895.045 as providing for an individual compari-
son. Legislative intent, a historical fact, is unchanging. Once
authoritatively construed, it is beyond alteration or recon-
struction by the court.31 Therefore, since the court had con-
strued section 895.045 as intending an individual comparison,
section 990.001 could no longer be raised.
Justice Hallows also relied upon the combined comparison
29. Wis. STAT. § 990.001(1) (1973).
30. Padway, supra note 5, at 17-18.
31. Klinger v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 460, 202 N.W.2d 31 (1972); Meyer v. Industrial
Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 377, 108 N.W.2d 556 (1961). See also Zimmerman v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968); La Follette v. Circuit Court,
37 Wis. 2d 329, 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967); City of Sun Prairie v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
37 Wis. 2d 96, 154 N.W.2d 360 (1967).
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rules applicable in the states of Arkansas, Connecticut, Ne-
vada and Texas as a basis for his argument. His reliance, how-
ever, is misplaced for several reasons. Connecticut, Nevada and
Texas provide for the combined comparison rule by express
statutory language.32 Obviously then, the rules in these states
are dissimilar from the Wisconsin statute and likewise irrele-
vant to the Wisconsin construction thereof. Arkansas also pro-
vides for a combined comparison rule by statute,33 but the rule
was originally adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in the
case of Walton v. Tull.34 Walton however is readily distinguish-
able from Wisconsin law in two respects. First and foremost,
the circumstances under which Walton was decided differed
from the circumstances facing the Wisconsin court. Arkansas
32. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978):
(a) In causes of action based on negligence, contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover dam-
ages resulting from injury to persons or damage to property, if such negligence
was not greater than the (combined negligence of the person or persons) against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Nav. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1977):
1. In any action to recover damages for injury to persons or property in which
contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense, the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery if the negligence of the person
seeking recovery was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the
person or persons against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person seeking recovery.
2. In such cases, the judge may, and when requested by any party shall
instruct the jury that:
(a) The plaintiff may not recover if his contributory negligence has contrib-
uted more to the injury than the negligence of the defendant or the (combined
negligence of multiple defendants).
Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978):
Section 1. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or party to recover damages for negilgence resulting in death or injury
to persons or property if such negligence is not greater than the (negligence of
the person or party or persons or parties) against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributed to the person or party recovering.
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (Supp. 1977):
If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is of less degree than the
fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to
recover damages, then the claiming party is entitled to recover the amount of
his damages after they have been diminished in proportion to the degree of his
own fault. If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is equal to or
greater in degree than (any fault chargeable to the party or parties) from whom
the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is not
entitled.
34. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
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had adopted a pure comparative negligence statute which pre-
vented .a plaintiff from ever being barred from recovery simply
because his negligence exceeded that of the defendant." In 1961
this pure comparative.negligence statute was repealed and a
more restrictive doctrine of comparative negligence replaced
it." The statute applicable at the time the accident occurred
in Walton provided that the plaintiff was barred from recovery
by his contributory negligence unless it was less than that of
the person, firm or corporation causing the damages. 31 Thus,
when the Arkansas court was forced to decide the issue of
whether the legislature intended an individual comparison or
a combined comparison, the court had to bear in mind that the
statute in question was a restricted version of an earlier pure
comparative negligence statute. The court based its decision to
implement a combined rule upon its disbelief that the legisla-
ture, in amending and repealing-the earlier statute, "meant to
go any [further] than to deny a recovery to a plaintiff whose
own negligence was at least 50 percent of the cause of his dam-
age." 1 In view of the history of the Arkansas comparative negli-
gence law, such a ruling was both reasonable and justified. The
court was simply adhering to the rule of construction permit-
ting the history and development of a law to be considered in
interpreting a successor statute. 9 Because Wisconsin's compar-
ative negligence statute has had an entirely different history,
reliance upon Walton is misplaced. The factual background
which validates the Walton rule is completely absent in Wis-
consin.
It must also be noted that Walton presented an issue of first
impression." Unlike Wisconsin, the Arkansas court did not
have the assistance of, nor was it bound by, prior decisions on
the proper interpretation of the statute. Wisconsin differs in
that, not only has there been a definitive declaration of the
legislative intent and interpretation of section 895.045, but that
decision has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions over a
period of thirty-four years.
Justice Hallows later reiterated his dislike of the individual
35. 1955 Ark. Acts 191.
36. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962).
37. Id.
38. 234 Ark. at _ 356 S.W.2d at 26.
39. Peterson Produce- Co. v. Cheney, 237 Ark. 600, 374 S.W.2d 809 (1964); 73 Am.
JuR. 2d Statutes § 192 (1974).
40. 234 Ark. at -, 356 S.W.2d at 20, 25.
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comparison rule in the leading case of Vincent v. Pabst Brew-
ing Co." Vincent involved the issues of whether Wisconsin
should adopt pure comparative negligence and whether the
supreme court had the power to effectuate such a change. Once
again although the majority opinion did not raise or discuss the
issue of the individual versus combined comparison, Justice
Hallows addressed the matter in his dissenting opinion. In a
broadside attack on Wisconsin's modified approach to compar-
ative negligence, Hallows pointed to the individual comparison
rule as a particularly poignant reason why the supreme court
should judicially adopt a form of pure comparative negligence.
The Wisconsin rule is not just a 50-50 deal because the plain-
tiffs negligence must be compared with the negligence of
each defendant separately. If there are two defendants, the
plaintiff cannot recover if all parties are all equally negli-
gent. . . .If it were a four-car collision, the plaintiff could
not recover if he was 25 percent guilty of negligence and all
the rest were equally negligent. Where is the justice in deny-
ing all recovery to a person 25 percent negligent when the
other persons causing it are 75 percent negligent in the
aggregate? The plaintiffs chance of recovery ought not to
depend upon the fortuitous number of persons responsible for
the loss.42
Despite this language, the individual comparison rule was
again reaffirmed in the 1975 case of Mariuzza v. Kenower4 3
Citing Schwenn, the court stated that the "general rule in
this state is that the comparison of negligence in a multiple-
defendant case is required to be between the plaintiff and indi-
vidual defendants."44 Mariuzza dealt with the sole exception to
this general rule which operates when there is a joint duty on
the part of the defendants, who have an equal opportunity to
protect the plaintiff, and as a matter of law neither the obliga-
tion nor the breach thereof are divisible. In Mariuzza the plain-
tiff was suing for personal injuries sustained during a fall on a
patch of ice, located on a flight of stairs owned by one defen-
dant and rented by another. Because the duties of the defen-
dants and the opportunities to correct the situation were une-
qual, the supreme court refused to permit the aggregation of
41. 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
42. Id. at 136, 177 N.W.2d at 520 (footnote and citations omitted).
43. 68 Wis. 2d 321, 228 N.W.2d 702 (1975).
44. Id. at 325, 228 N.W.2d at 704.
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the defendants' negligence. The court also based its refusal to
permit aggregation of the defendants' negligence on the fact
that the plaintiff's counsel failed to request an instruction on
the matter thus making the request on appeal untimely. Al-
though Mariuzza was a run of the mill case, it illustrated the
complete and unquestioned a.cceptance of the individual com-
parison rule as law in Wisconsin.
The most recent decision dealing with the proper construc-
tion of section 895.045 is the case of Soczka v. Rechner.45 In this
1976 case, the court squarely faced the issue of whether a plain-
tiff should be entitled to recover in instances where his negli-
gence is less than 50 percent of the total negligence, but is more
than any one of the individual defendants. The court also faced
the collateral issue of the propriety and power of the court to
effectuate such a change. The central facts in Soczka involved
a three vehicle collision wherein the jury apportioned the cas-
ual negligence of the parties as 45% for the plaintiff, 30% for
the first defendant and 25% for the second. After rejecting
plaintiff's attempt to combine the negligence of the defendants
on an agency theory, the supreme court addressed the com-
bined comparison issue. It is interesting to note that the court,
by its own admission, could have avoided this matter since
plaintiff's counsel failed to raise the issue in the lower court."
Nevertheless, the court ignored the acknowledged procedural
defect and proceeded to decide the issue on its merits. In the
strongest language possible the court declared that it had
"repeatedly interpreted the comparative negligence statute as
clearly providing that the comparison of negligence between
the plaintiff and multiple tortfeasors [involves] a separate
comparison between the plaintiff and each of the defend-
ants."4 Thus, the court rejected the plaintiff's plea to over-
throw the rule. The court also declared that if any such change
was to be forthcoming, the legislature was the proper govern-
mental body to undertake it. The court noted that as late as
1971 the comparative negligence statute had been amended
and the legislature had not seen fit at that time to adopt a
change with regard to multiple tortfeasor cases. Thus, in defer-
ence to the legislature, "any change in the statute created by
45. 73 Wis. 2d 157, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976).
46. Id. at 164, 242 N.W.2d at 914.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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the legislature [was to be made] by legislative action."48 In
essence the court, sub silentio, invoked the acquiescence rule
to preclude judicial change or action in this area.
There is language, however, in Soczka which would seem to
reserve the right of the supreme court to judicially alter the
individual comparison rule.49 The court cited Lupie v.
Hartzheim,0 for the proposition that it had inherent power to
change the comparative negligence rule despite the existence
of section 895.045 and its legislative amendments. Once pro-
perly construed, however, this language refers only to the pow-
ers of the court to adopt pure comparative negligence and not
to the power of the court to alter the individual comparison
rule.
In order to understand the proper meaning of the language
in Soczka, it must be made clear that the plaintiff in Soczka
had a threefold attack on the law applicable to the case at
hand. In addition to attempting to utilize agency to aggregate
the tortfeasors' negligence, the plaintiff made two additional
arguments. First, he argued that the court should overrule
Walker and replace it with a combined comparison approach,
or second, that it should judicially adopt pure comparative
negligence. As is obvious, any one of the three alternatives
would have resulted in a recovery by the plaintiff. Each alter-
native, however, was separate and conceptually distinct. When
the court spoke of its inherent power to change the comparative
negligence rule, it was in reference to the last argument alone,
that of adopting pure comparative negligence. This conclusion
is supported not only by the fact that the court cited Lupie, but
also by the inherent inability of the court to change express,
fixed 
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gence statute so as to permit recovery. This would entail either
adopting a pure comparative negligence approach or at least
increasing the applicable percentage at which a plaintiff would
be barred. Relying upon Vincent, the Lupie court reaffirmed its
inherent common-law power to alter the comparative negli-
gence statute, but again refused to take that step since, accord-
ing to the court, the legislature was better equipped to alter
this law. The issue in Lupie was strictly limited to the power
of the court to adopt pure comparative negligence or at least
some system more liberal than the then existing 49% plan. The
issue of individual versus combined comparison was not argued
in Lupie, nor could it have been, since Lupie involved only a
single defendant. Moreover, the Vincent case on which Lupie
relied, and where the inherent power language first appeared,
also dealt exclusively with the ability of the court to adopt a
pure comparative negligence approach. Thus, because of the
plaintiff's threefold attack in the Soczka case, and the court's
reliance upon Lupie, the inherent power language in Soczka
must be construed as referring to only the pure comparative
negligence arguments of the plaintiff.
A second reason which supports the conclusion that the
inherent power language refers only to the judicial adoption of
pure comparative negligence lies in the functions of the court
vis-a-vis interpretation of statutes versus the court's preroga-
tives over the common law. It is hornbook law that the judicial
branch of government must defer to any constitutionally sound
legislative pronouncement.' The motivation prompting the
enactment of otherwise valid legislation is subject neither to
judicial review nor to the court's approval or condemnation.52
Decisions as to the propriety or wisdom of a statute are beyond
the power of the court. 3
Assuming a statute can pass constitutional muster, the role
of the court thereafter is limited to the proper construction,
interpretation and application of the statute. To be construed
in the first instance, a statute must contain some ambiguity.
51. Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 235 N.W.2d
648 (1975); Chart v. Gutmann, 44 Wis. 2d 421, 171 N.W.2d 331 (1969); Bisenius v.
Kams, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377 (1969); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Wisconsin
Lake Dist. Bd. of Review, 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968).
52. Harvey v. Morgan, 30 Wis. 2d 1, 139 N.W.2d 585 (1966).
53. Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377 (1969); City of West Allis v.
Milwaukee County, 39 Wis. 2d 356, 159 N.W.2d 36 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1064
(1969); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 224 Wis. 398, 272 N.W. 457 (1937).
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Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, any interpretation
thereof is both unnecessary and improper.54 The primary pur-
pose of all statutory construction is to discover and implement
the legislative intent.-" Legislative intent is determined by ex-
amining the statutory language in relation to its scope, history,
content, subject matter and the object to be accomplished. 6
Courts may not, under the guise of construing statutes, rewrite
them57 nor may the canons of statutory construction be used to
defeat the obvious legislative intent.5
Once a statutory construction has been conclusively estab-
lished, it becomes as much a part of the statute as if embodied
therein by plain and unmistakable language;59 thereafter, only
the legislature can change the judicial construction." Legisla-
tive acquiescence in the court's construction is not an equivocal
act.' The legislature is presumed to know that unless the stat-
ute is amended it will continue to be applied as originally inter-
preted. 2 Consequently the failure to amend a statute to alter
the court's construction is viewed as an acknowledgement by
the legislature that the court's interpretation of the legislative
intent was correct. 3 For this reason the court is constrained
54. Young v. Board of Educ., 74 Wis. 2d 144, 246 N.W.2d 230 (1976); Milwaukee
County v. Wisconsin Council on Crim. Justice, 73 Wis. 2d 237, 243 N.W.2d 485 (1976);
Weather-Tite Co. v. Leeper, 25 Wis. 2d 70, 130 N.W.2d 198 (1964).
55. In re Estate of Walker, 75 Wis. 2d 93, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977); Heidersdorf v.
State, 5 Wis. 2d 120, 92 N.W.2d 217 (1958); Safe Way Motor Coach Co. v. City of Two
Rivers, 256 Wis. 35, 39 N.W.2d 847 (1949).
56. Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. State Dept. of Transp., 78 Wis. 2d 235, 253 N.W.2d
896 (1977); Czaicki v. Czaicki, 73 Wis. 2d 9, 242 N.W.2d 214 (1976); Perry Creek
Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agr. Chem. Co., 29 Wis. 2d 429, 139 N.W.2d 96 (1966).
57. Sinclair v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 77 Wis. 2d 322, 253 N.W.2d
245 (1977).
58. Lewis Realty, Inc. v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers' Bd., 6 Wis. 2d 99, 94
N.W.2d 238 (1959).
59. See note 31 supra.
60. Lampada v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 58 Wis. 2d 315, 206 N.W.2d 138 (1973);
Kramer v. City of Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); Zimmerman v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968); Meyer v. Industrial
Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 377, 108 N.W.2d 556 (1961).
61. Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648
(1968). See also Lampada v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 58 Wis. 2d 315, 206 N.W.2d
138 (1973); Klinger v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 460, 202 N.W.2d 31 (1972); Estate of Pamanet,
46 Wis. 2d 514, 175 N.W.2d 234 (1970); Salerno v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 37 Wis. 2d
433, 155 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
62. Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648
(1968).
63. Klinger v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 480, 202 N.W.2d 31 (1972); Zimmerman v. Wiscon-
sin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968); Briggs & Stratton Corp.
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from subsequently altering its construction. 4 These rules were
highlighted in the case of Chart v. Gutmann:65
"Where a law passed by the legislature has been construed
by the courts, legislative acquiescence in or refusal to pass a
measure that would defeat the courts' construction is not an
equivocal act. The legislature is presumed to know that in
absence of its changing the law, the construction put upon it
by the courts will remain unchanged; for the principle of the
courts' decision-legislative intent-is a historical fact and,
hence, unchanging. Thus, when the legislature acquiesces or
refuses to change the law, it has acknowledged that the
courts' interpretation of legislative intent is correct. This
being so, however, the courts are henceforth constrained not
to alter their construction; having correctly determined legis-
lative intent, they have fulfilled their function." 6
Unlike statutory constructions, rules of common law are
subject to change by the court. Common law, being a creature
of the judiciary, is subject to alieration and abolition by the
judiciary. 7 The issue then, of whether the court hasthe power
to change the individual comparison rule depends upon
whether the rule is a creature of the common law or an interpre-
tative adjunct of section 895.045. A similar issue was presented
in the case of Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co."5
The defendant in Zimmerman petitioned the court to exercise
its common law prerogative to alter the Wisconsin law permit-
ting suits against co-employees under the worker's compensa-
tion statutes. The supreme court denied the defendant's re-
quest and held that the rule was a matter of statutory origin
and thus beyond the power of the court.
The court has thus construed secs. 102.16(3) and 102.29(1)
Stats., against the interest of the appellant. It has often been
v. Department of Taxation, 248 Wis. 160, 21 N.W.2d 441 (1946); State Cent. Comm.
of Progressive Party v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 240 Wis. 204, 3 N.W.2d 123 (1942);
Milwaukee County v. City of Milwaukee, 210 Wis. 335, 246 N.W. 447 (1933).
64. See notes 59-63 supra.
65. 44 Wis. 2d 421, 171 N.W.2d 331 (1969).
66. Id. at 431, 171 N.W.2d at 336 (quoting Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power
Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648, 651 (1968)).
67. Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 248 N.W.2d 433
(1977). See, e.g., Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)
(judicial abolition of common-law governmental immunity); Bielski v. Schulze, 16
Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962) (judicial abolition of common-law pro rata contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors and adoption of pure comparative contribution).
68. 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968).
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said that once a construction has been given to a statute, the
construction becomes a part of the statute; and it is within
the province of the legislature alone to change the law ...
Anticipating, perhaps, the application of the rule that the
legislature alone can change the law after its construction by
the court, appellant calls attention to the court's abrogation
of governmental and parental immunities. In Holytz v. City
of Milwaukee, . . . where goverimental immunity from suit
was abolished, and in Goller v. White, . . . abolishing paren-
tal immunity in negligence cases with two exceptions, the
court declared that it had a responsibility to change a court-
made rule of the law when the interests of justice so demand
even though the legislature refused to make the change.
These cases have no application because the rule here was not
court-made. The decisions of the court holding that a fellow
employee is not immune from a third-party action are not a
product of the court's ideas of what justice demands but are
attempts to determine what the legislature intended when in
the exercise of its power it amended the law. . . .[H]aving
correctly determined legislative intent, they have fulfilled
their function.69
Similarly, the decision of the supreme court to determine
liability on a one-to-one basis in negligence actions is also not
a product of the court's ideas of what justice demands, but
rather is an interpretation of the legislative intent underlying
section 895.045. Walker and all of its progeny clearly document
the fact that the individual comparison rule is a product of
section 895.045 and the language contained therein. Therefore,
the supreme court's inherent power to alter the common law
has no application to the individual comparison issue. This
rule is of statutory origin.
While the individual comparison rule has never had unani-
mous support from the Wisconsin court, nevertheless, it has
been a well-settled and accepted construction of section
895.045. Thus, it is surprising that the court in May v. Skelly
Oil "concluded that this rule, a court-made doctrine, can be
changed by court decision."70 Unfortunately for both the bench
and bar, the court neglected to cite any authority for this prop-
osition. In defense of the court it should be noted that citation
of authority was unnecessary since the language of the court
69. Id. at 633-34, 157 N.W.2d at 651 (footnote and citations omitted).
70. 83 Wis. 2d at 38-39, 264 N.W.2d at 578.
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was technically no more than obiter dicta." Presumably the
court was relying upon Vincent to support its action. Detailed
analysis of this case, however, along with its progeny, espe-
cially Soczka, manifest that such reliance is ill-placed. Accord-
ing to the clear language of Soczka, the individual comparison
rule is not a court made doctrine in its classical sense.72 Rather,
it is a product of statutory interpretation. In the court's words
it is an interpretive rule "clearly provided" by section 895.045.
Thus, in order to effectuate the change indicated in May, it
would be necessary for the rule to be altered within the frame-
work of the rules applicable to statutory construction.
The court could accomplish its stated desire without ex-
ceeding the bounds of the judicial role by adopting pure com-
parative negligence. Such a move would make the issue of com-
bined versus individual comparison moot. Ever since Vincent
the supreme court has reserved the power to alter the compara-
tive negligence rule from that of the present modified form of
comparative negligence to one of pure comparative negligence.
Although there are serious and possibly insurmountable prob-
lems with the judicial adoption of pure comparative negli-
gence, where a statute provides for a modified approach, at
least the court would have the benefit of some prior judicial
precedent. The court has no such precedent for the change
envisioned in May. Paradoxically, there is more precedent for
the court adopting pure comparative negligence than there is
for the court adopting the May language.
In conclusion, analysis of pre-May cases indicate that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is both without precedent or author-
ity to alter the individual comparison rule. Section 895.045 of
the Wisconsin Statutes, according to past supreme court deci-
sons, clearly provides for a comparison on a one-to-one basis.
Continued court adherence to the rule as well as acquiescence
by the legislature indicate that the court's original interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent was correct. Although the supreme
court's desire to change the rule is commendable, the plain fact
remains that the court is without constitutional power to effec-
71. The Supreme Court in May v. Skelly Oil dismissed one of the two defendants
against whom recovery was sought. Because this left only one defendant, the issue of
combined versus individual comparison became moot. Despite the absence of a con-
tested issue, Justices Abrahamson, Day and Callow, stated that they believed this case
was an opportune time fsr the court to change the rule.
72. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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tuate the change. The power of the judiciary is a limited one
and does not extend to legislating what the court perceives to
be more fair or more equitable.
Nevertheless, the supreme court has clearly indicated its
intent to alter the rule. Though it is still possible for the court
to alter its course, to do so would necessitate losing face. This
is one of the principal problems which results when a court
gratuitously predicts a major shift in a rule of law in a case
wherein the change cannot be effected. If the supreme court
does carry out its intention, the ramifications for traditional
negligence law will be tremendous. The remainder of this com-
ment will attempt to elucidate some of the more immediate
effects of the new rule. Specifically, the issues of the extent of
liability, joint and several liability, comparative contribution,
releases, countersuits, cross-claims and worker's compensation
will all be discussed.
H. May v. Skelly Oil AND CHANGES IN
EXISTING WISCONSIN LAW
A. Extent of Liability
Before one can ascertain the effects which May v. Skelly Oil
will have on the liability of defendants, the precise parameters
of the May decision must be restated. May, according to the
words of the supreme court, is limited to multiple defendant
suits wherein the combined negligence of the defendants ex-
ceeds or equals that of the plaintiff. May does not apply if there
is only one defendant or if the combined negligence of the mul-
tiple defendants falls below that of the plaintiff.
Given the circumstances under which May would thus be
applicable, the decision would have two primary effects on the
liability of defendants. First, and of utmost importance to the
supreme court, the decision would allow claimants to recover
in instances where previously they would have been barred by
the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute. As an inverse
corollary, the decision would also impose liability on defen-
dants less negligent than the plaintiff whereas prior to May
they would have been freed from responsibility. This much
seems perfectly clear from the decision. To illustrate the appli-
cation of this new rule perhaps a brief examination of May's
factual setting would be appropriate.
The facts giving rise to May occurred in 1970 when the
driver of a petroleum truck slipped and fell at a loading ter-
[Vol. 62:205
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minal owned by the defendants. After bringing suit against the
operators of the terminal, defendants impleaded the plaintiff's
employer seeking indemnification.73 Upon submission of the
case to the jury, the plaintiff was found 45% causally negligent,
the operators of the terminal 45%, and the employer 10%.74
Because the statute in effect at the time of the accident barred
recovery unless the plaintiffs negligence was less than that of
the defendant's, 7 the plaintiff was completely barred from any
award. However, had the combined comparison rule been in
effect, the results would have been different. The percentages
then would have been plaintiff 45%, versus 55% for the defen-
dants. In this situation the plaintiffs negligence would ob-
viously have been less than that of the defendants' and the
plaintiff would have been entitled to a recovery. It is precisely
this result that the supreme court now intends.
Although the intention of the supreme court is clear when
the above rule is applied to a factual situation such as that
presented in May, the court's intention is less clear when ap-
plied to other situations. Suppose that instead of the above
situation, one defendant is found more negligent than the
plaintiff, and thus under traditional constructions of the com-
parative negligence statute, plaintiff would be entitled to re-
cover his damages from that tortfeasor. For example, if a plain-
tiff was found to be 33% causally negligent, defendant A 34%,
defendant B 30%, and defendant C 3%, defendant A would be
liable to the plaintiff under the traditional rules and defen-
dants B and C would be exonerated from liability.76 However,
73. Indemnification in this case was based on a contractual agreement between the
employer and the defendant. Thus the exclusive remedy provisions of the worker's
compensation statute were inapplicable. 83 Wis. 2d at 39, 264 N.W.2d at 578.
74. Id. at 32, 264 N.W.2d at 575.
75. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1969) (emphasis added):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
of the person against whom recovery.is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering.
76. See, e.g., Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 536, 252 N.W.
721, 727-28 (1934).
If such contributory negligence [of the plaintiff] was [greater than] the negli-
gence of one of the tortfeasors against whom recovery is sought, then as to that
particular tortfeasor there still is no right to recover. That tortfeasor is out of
the picture as far as liability on his part to the party whose negligence was
[greater than] . . . his is concerned.
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the results which would occur subsequent to May would not be
so obvious.
The court's rationale in May for abandoning the individual
comparison interpretation was nominally that the individual
comparison rule led to "harsh and unfair results." The court
thought it unfair and inequitable that a plaintiff who was re-
sponsible for less than 51% of the total negligence could be
barred from any recovery. However, in the above described
situation, this rationale does not attach since plaintiff is al-
ready provided with an opportunity to recover from a legally
liable defendant. Thus, since the court's May reasoning does
not seem to apply, there is some question whether the court
would apply the May ruling to such a case.
Texas, which has statutorily adopted a combined compari-
son approach" would utilize the approach regardless of whether
any of the defendants would be held liable on an individual
basis." If the Wisconsin court adopts a combined comparison
rule, this result seems most appropriate since the liability of
defendants, less negligent than the plaintiff, should not turn on
whether one or more of the remaining defendants is individu-
ally more negligent than the plaintiff. Moreover, if the court
adopted the position that the May rule would not attach to
instances described above, an inequity would immediately re-
sult between defendants in actions where each defendant was
less negligent than the plaintiff, and defendants in actions
where one defendant was more negligent than the plaintiff. For
instance, suppose that instead of defendant A in the above
example being found 34% negligent, he was found 32% with the
reduced 2% being credited to defendant C. The percentages
would then be: plaintiff 33%, defendant A 32%, defendant B
30%, and defendant C 5%. Defendants B and C would now be
liable whereas formerly the reverse would have been true.
Surely it is unfair to defendants that their liability should rest
upon the chance that one defendant is at least as negligent as
the plaintiff or that each is less negligent than the plaintiff."
77. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978). Other states have
also adopted combined comparison rules. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (Supp.
1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 60-258a
(1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41-
141 (1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp.
1978).
78. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978) (by implication).
79. Justice Hallows saw the same inequality only applied in the reverse situation.
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After all, defendants cannot control whether another co-
defendant will be held more or less culpable than the plaintiff.
The issue would be academic however, if a strict construc-
tion were given to the rule suggested in May. Read literally, the
decision simply states that in determining the liability of the
parties, the negligence of the plaintiff is to be compared with
the combined negligence of the defendants. No qualification is
made that the rule is applicable only in cases where the negli-
gence of each defendant is less than that of the plaintiff.
Thus, it would seem that the Wisconsin court would adopt the
Texas approach and apply May to all multiple defendant suits
irrespective of whether one or more of the defendants were
liable on an individual basis.
Under a combined comparison approach an analogous ine-
quality would also arise between defendants to multiple party
suits and defendants to single party suits. As to the latter type,
if the single party defendant is found less negligent than the
plaintiff, then that defendant is free from liability. This is true
despite the fact that the negligence of the defendant may very
nearly approach that attributable to the plaintiff. Take for
instance the case where plaintiff is found 51% causally negli-
gent while the sole defendant is found 49%. In contrast suppose
that there are two defendants and the jury apportions 49% to
defendant A, 1% to defendant B, and the balance to the plain-
tiff. Defendant A, who like the defendant in the first case, is
49% causally negligent, and is less negligent than the plaintiff,
has only one distinguishing feature. That is, he is liable
whereas the other is not. Once again the liability of the defen-
dant less negligent than the plaintiff is being determined on the
fortuitous event of whether the plaintiff was injured by one
defendant or two.
These examples point out some of the inherent problems of
May. While the decision is both simple and apparently fair
when confined to its facts, this "fairness" seems to be some-
what limited. The supreme court intimated as much when it
stated that the rule was designed to adjust the inequities suf-
fered by plaintiffs. What the court failed to consider was the
possible interests of defendants when fashioning the May rule.
According to Justice Hallows, the plaintiff's chances of recovery under the individual
comparison rule ultimately rests upon the fortuitous number of defendants. Vincent




These then are the two primary effects which May will have
on the liability of multiple defendants. In reality, the decision
neither expands nor contracts the liability of defendants who
previously would have been held liable to the plaintiff. Rather,
what May accomplishes is an expansion of the number of par-
ties who may now be forced to respond in damages. Because
May increases the number of defendants subject to liability,
the decision will also affect those rules and doctrines which are
related or depend upon a finding of liability. For instance, joint
and several liability, releases, setoffs and contribution will all
be affected by May, since each is determined in part, or in
whole, by the parties' respective liabilities.
B. Joint and Several Liability
The present rule in Wisconsin regarding joint tortfeasors0
dictates that, upon a finding of common liability, each defen-
dant is individually liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's
damages reduced only by the percentage of causal negligence
attributable to the plaintiff."1 The recent case of Chart v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,82 illustrates the full effect of this rule. In
Chart the pertinent jury finding showed that a passenger-
plaintiff was 3% causally negligent while defendants' negli-
gence was determined to be as follows: General Motors 12%,
Vilas County 5%, two county employees 5% and the driver of
the plaintiffs car 75% .13 The driver of the car, to whom the bulk
of the causal negligence was attributed, was insolvent and the
damages of the plaintiff were roughly $777,000. In this particu-
lar case, General Motors, which was only 12% causally negli-
gent, was forced to pay 87% of the plaintiff's award. The 13%
which the defendant did not pay, represented the negligence of
the plaintiff plus the negligence of a settling defendant and the
negligence of the two county employees dismissed from the suit
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The rationale for joint and several liabilty is, of course, that
each defendant is responsible for the entire loss of the plaintiff,
80. Joint tortfeasors include any defendant whose tortious conduct has contributed
to causing a single, indivisible injury to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d
286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
81. Caldwell v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966);
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934). See also
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTS § 10.1 (1956).
82. 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
83. Id. at 99, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
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so that each can rightfully be called upon to pay the full
amount of plaintiff's damages.84 An even more fundamental
rationale is the desire to place the cost of insolvent defendants
upon the shoulders of remaining tortfeasors rather than upon
innocent injured parties. Naturally, the plaintiff is entitled to
but one satisfaction and thus, upon full payment, cannot seek
additional compensation from defendants never executed
upon. 5 Moreover, a defendant who pays in excess of his as-
signed degree of fault is able to seek contribution from those
commonly liable tortfeasors up to the amount of their respec-
tive percentages of causal negligence.
The May decision does not necessarily spell a change in this
common law rule. All May necessarily effects is a change in the
number of parties who may now be held jointly and severally
liable. 6 Whereas prior to May, defendants who were less negli-
gent than the plaintiff in multi-defendant suits could avoid the
effects of joint and several liability, subsequent to May these
defendants will be forced, with the full rigors of joint and sev-
eral liability, to compensate the plaintiff.
The problem with this proposition is that a defendant less
negligent than the plaintiff can now be held liable for the full
amount of the loss occasioned by all of the defendants' negli-
gence. For instance, if the plaintiff is found 50% negligent and
defendant A 5%, while defendant B is 45%, then defendant A
could, under May's dictum, be forced to pay 50%' of the plain-
tiff's damages. The inequity of this situation is clear.87 Defen-
dant A, responsible for only 5% of the plaintiffs injuries, and
who is far less negligent than the plaintiff, must assume 50%
of the damages. Moreover, if defendant B is immune" or insol-
vent, defendant A is without remedy to shift the loss to some
84. See generally 74 AM. Ju. 2d Torts § 62 (1974).
85. Anstine v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 Pa. 547, 43 A.2d 109 (1945); Morse v. Modern
Woodmen of America, 166 Wis. 194, 164 N.W. 829 (1917).
86. In Arkansas for instance the judicial adoption of the combined comparison rule
did not alter the rule of joint and several liability. Thus in Arkansas if plaintiff was
20% and defendants 10%, 20% and 50%, plaintiff could recover from any of the defen-
dants - even those whose negligence was less than that of the plaintiff. Walton v. Tull,
234 Ark. 884, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
87. The concept of joint and several liability may of course produce some
unfairness to particular defendants if the aggregate approach is used. A defen-
dant with a small portion of negligence may become liable for a large portion of
the damages.
V. ScHwARTz, CompuTms NE LIGENCE § 16.7, at 260 (1974).
88. See text accompanying note 110-113 infra.
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other more culpable party. Such a result as above would occur
if the combined comparison approach were adopted without
altering the rules of joint and several liability.
Other jurisdictions considering this problem have acted to
ameliorate these results. Oregon, for instance, provides by stat-
ute for a combined comparison rule in multiple defendant
suits.89 However, only those defendants more causally negligent
than the plaintiff on a one-to-one comparison are jointly and
severally liable. 0 Defendants less negligent than the plaintiff
are liable only to the extent of their respective percentage of
causal negligence.9'
It is not certain that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will
adopt an Oregon approach. In Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mu-
tual Casualty Co.,92 the court ruled that the "doctrine of com-
parative negligence [should] not be extended so that a co-
tortfeasor could not be held liable for more than the sum which
represented his percentage of causal negligence.' 3 The court
immediately recognized that to do so would abrogate the rule
of joint and several liability. In Fitzgerald damages were found
to be $50,000 while the plaintiff and two defendants were found
to be 5%, 30%, and 65% causally negligent. Since the second
defendant was judgment proof, the first defendant, when faced
with the possibility that he might have to satisfy the entire
award, argued that his total liability should be limited to
$15,000 or 30% of the judgment. The court, relying on Chille
v. Howell" and Walker, 5 reiterated the rule that the compara-
tive negligence statute did not alter the rules of joint and sev-
eral liability. That rule as stated by the Walker court is as
follows:
[T]here is no provision [in the comparative negligence stat-
ute] which effects any change in the common-law rule that
all tortfeasors who are liable at all are liable to the injured
person for the entire amount now recoverable by him."
Thus, because the adoption of the comparative negligence
statute did not alter the common-law rule of joint and several
89. OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1977).
90. Id. § 18.485.
91. Id.
92. 67 Wis. 2d 321, 227 N.W.2d 444 (1975).
93. Id. at 331, 227 N.W.2d at 449.
94. 34 Wis. 2d 491, 149 N.W.2d 600 (1967).
95. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
96. Id. at 536, 252 N.W. 727.
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liability, there is little reason for the supreme court's new rein-
terpretation of the statute to make that change. Technically,
there is nothing to bar the operation of joint and several liabil-
ity on less negligent defendants if the defendants' combined
negligence exceeds that of the plaintiff. Aside from technical
considerations, however, there are the matters of equity and
justice. As indicated above,97 fairness may dictate that
several liability be limited to those defendants whose negli-
gence is greater or equal to that of the plaintiff. After all, May
was prompted by what the court thought to be harsh and unfair
results. Thus it seems only proper that the court alter the col-
lateral rules of comparative negligence so that both plaintiffs
and defendants receive an even-handed result. Moreover, the
rule of joint and several liability, being judge-madels permits
the court to make judicial alterations. Whether it does so is a
matter of speculation.
C. Contribution
By virtue of the operation of joint and several liability a
defendant may be required to pay an amount of damages
greater than the percentage of causal negligence attributable to
his conduct." This inequity is rectified by permitting the de-
fendant to seek contribution from other commonly liable defen-
dants. In order to recover on a claim of contribution, the defen-
dant must show that both parties are jointly negligent, that
they have common liability because of such negligence and
that one party has borne an unequal portion of the common
burden. 00
The rule of combined comparison affects the law of contri-
bution by altering the second element, that of common liabil-
ity. Insofar as May exposes a new class of defendants to liabil-
ity, it also necessarily exposes those same defendants to claims
of contribution. The difference between the pre-May applica-
tion of the contribution rule and the post-May application
could be striking when viewed in the context of an actual case.
For instance, if a plaintiff is found 30% causally negligent while
defendant A is found 20% and defendant B 50%,I 1 under tradi-
97. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
98. Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976) (by implication).
99. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
100. Wurtzinger v. Jacobs, 33 Wis. 2d 703, 148 N.W.2d 86 (1967); Farmers Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959).
101. For a similar hypothetical situation, see Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis.
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tional interpretations of the comparative negligence statute,
defendant A would be exonerated from all liability while defen-
dant B would be responsible for the full 70%. More impor-
tantly, defendant B would be unable to seek contribution from
defendant A because commonality of liability would be lack-
ing. Although the rule of comparative contribution allows a
defendant to recover from a less negligent co-defendant, (i.e.
contribution in Wisconsin is pure comparative contribution) 02
the rule only takes effect once the contributing defendant can
be found to be liable in the first instance. Under past construc-
tions of the comparative negligence statute, this meant that
the individual defendant's negligence had to be equal to or
greater than that of the plaintiff. Under a combined compari-
son rule the result would be entirely different. Since each de-
fendant would be liable to the plaintiff under the combined
comparison approach, the element of common liabilty, absent
under the old rule, would be present and thus permit contribu-
tion. Now, the second defendant would be able to shift 20% of
the plaintiff's loss to defendant A. The combined comparison
approach therefore has the inadvertant effect of mitigating the
inequality that previously existed when defendants liable
under the rules of joint and several liability were forced without
remedy to pick up that portion of damages attributable to the
less negligent defendants.
As the raison d'etre of comparative negligence is to appor-
tion the amount of liability according to the degree of fault, this
result seems best. It is desirable in that legally liable defen-
dants should not be left without recourse to recover those dam-
ages which they have paid and which were in fact occasioned
by the acts of less negligent defendants. Although a less negli-
gent defendant may have only caused 20% of a plaintiff's dam-
ages, while at the same time plaintiff was responsible for 30%,
this still presents no cogent reason for the remaining defendant
to pay an additional 20%.
D. Settlements
The ramifications of May discussed in the preceding section
are similarly applicable to settlements. Before discussing these
ramifications, however, it should be noted that May will proba-
bly have the effect of increasing or encouraging settlements in
2d 120, 135, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1970) (Hallows, J., dissenting).
102. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
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multi-defendant suits. Since May increases the number of po-
tentially liable tortfeasors it is reasonable to assume that the
number of settlements will likewise increase. Previously, where
a defendant felt his negligence was insignificant when com-
pared with that of the plaintiff, he may have been willing to
undergo the risks of a trial and a finding of negligence greater
or equal to that of the plaintiff. This must have been true
especially in the multi-defendant suit where the defendant was
reasonably sure that the bulk of the negligence would be attrib-
uted to the plaintiff and the other co-defendants. In view of the
May rule, however, a defendant who is less negligent than the
plaintiff may now be held liable. Because the risk of liability
increases, the desirability of a settlement grows.103
If a defendant settles, however, he does not by doing so
recapture the precise position he would have occupied under an
individual comparison approach. To give an example, suppose
in a simple negligence action a jury apportions the causal negli-
gence among the several parties as such: plaintiff 33%, defen-
dant A 30%, and defendant B 37%. Suppose in addition that
plaintiffs total damages are $10,000 and defendant A settles
for $5,000 taking a Pierringer release." 4 Under the individual
comparison rule defendant A would not be liable to the plain-
tiff as his negligence is less than that of the plaintiff. More
importantly, defendant A could seek to recover the cost of his
settlement from the remaining defendant on the basis of either
subrogation 5 or indemnity.105 Thus if defendant B is solvent
103. In all fairness it should be pointed out that an equally respectable prediction
could be made that the combined comparision rule will inhibit settlements. Although
defendants may have an increased incentive to enter into expedient settlements, such
is not necessarily the case for claimants. An extreme example which best demonstrates
this point is one where the plaintiff is negotiating with a defendant who represents the
greatest pool of financial resources yet also represents the party least likely to be held
more negligent than the plaintiff. Under the individual comparison rule, in view of the
improbability of a judgment being lodged against this defendant, a plaintiff would be
well advised to accept an even relatively modest offer. Contrariwise, it would be fool-
hardy for a plaintiff under a combined comparison approach to agree to any release
absent a rather sizeable and substantial agreement. Thus instead of encouraging set-
tlements, the new rule could have the effect of forcing claimants to be less compromis-
ing.
104. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
105.Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 35 Wis. 2d
237, 151 N.W.2d 104 (1967); Perkins v. Worzala, 31 Wis. 2d 634,143 N.W.2d 516 (1966).
106. Perkins v. Worzala, 31 Wis. 2d 634, 143 N.W.2d 516 (1966). In Perkins the
court said the proper cause of action was one in subrogation but admitted that it arose
under the principles of indemnity. See also Defense Research Institute, Comparative
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and not immune from liability, defendant A could recover the
cost of his entire settlement and avoid any loss whatsoever. The
recovery of course, would be based on the fact that defendant
A was not found liable to the plantiff. However, were defendant
A to be held liable, he would of course be prevented from seek-
ing indemnification. Rather his settlement would go to satisfy
that percentage of negligence attributable to his conduct, or as
in this case, the dollar amount of the award. This result would
follow from the interplay between the Pierringer release and
the finding that the defendant was liable. In this latter case,
defendant A would only be able to recover $2,000 on a claim
for contribution."7 In the former case he would have been enti-
tled to recover the full $5,000.
This difference in results illustrates the effect of changing
from an individual comparison rule to a combined comparison
rule. As argued in the section on contribution, this result,
though unintended by the supreme court, is far more fair and
equitable than was the past practice. 0 8 Under a combined com-
parison rule, defendants who are more negligent than the plain-
tiff will not be forced to suffer the loss from the negligence of
parties who have settled and were found less negligent. Thus
in the area of settlements, May renders a just and fair result.
E. Counterclaims
The effect of May on counterclaims likewise flows from the
change in the rules of liability. Since recovery may now be had
in more cases against more parties the number of successful
counterclaims will undoubtedly increase. The combined com-
parison rule would naturally operate for all claimants whether
they be deemed plaintiffs, counterclaiming defendants, cross-
claimants or third party claimants. Although the supreme
court focused only on plaintiffs in discussing its intention to
change the individual comparison rule, any other construction
would be subject to immediate constitutional attack. In short,
recovery cannot depend upon which party wins the race to the
Negligence Primer 28 (Oct. 1975); C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL § 1.340 (1971).
107. A settling party is not always barred from seeking contribution simply because
he has entered into a settlement with the plaintiff. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959). See also Defense
Research Institute, Comparative Negligence Primer 34 n.268 (Oct. 1975).




courthouse. Thus one effect of May will undoubtedly be to
increase the number of counterclaiming parties. It is only rea-
sonable to assume that as the chances for success on counter-
claims increase so too will the number of counterclaims
brought.
F. Set-Offs
Set-offs under May will be both more likely and more com-
plex since the new rule increases the number of parties to be
calculated in determining the appropriate set-offs and bal-
ances. For example, suppose that after a three-vehicle colli-
sion, driver A brings suit against drivers B and C, and then C
counterclaims against A and crosscomplains against B for his
damages. Upon a jury trial, a verdict is returned finding A 10%
at fault, B 60% and C 30%. Moreover, A's damages are assessed
at $10,000 while those of C are $5,000. Driver B is insolvent and
uninsured.
Under the individual comparison rule, A could collect 90%
of his damages from C who would in turn be barred from recov-
ery since his negligence exceeded that of A. There would then
be no need for a set-off, since A would simply collect $9,000
from C.
However, under May, A would only collect $5,500 as a result
of a set-off. The combined comparison rule would permit C to
combine A's negligence with that of B so that the percentages
would be 30% for the counterclaimant and 70% in the aggregate
for the defendants. Moreover 70% of C's damages would be
$3,500. Thus C could collect $3,500 from A. Upon a set-off
($9,000-$3,500), the figure of $5,500 would be determined as the
final figure to be received by A.' The combined comparison
rule necessitates a set-off in this situation, where previously
there would have been no need for one. By extrapolating from
this simple situation to more complex suits, one can readily
appreciate the aggravation May will present to the already
existing problems surrounding the practice of set-offs.
G. Immune Co-Defendants
The Wisconsin court has consistently held that all parties
to an accident, whether or not they are joined in the action,
109. Ross v. Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936). In Ross the court said
it was error to instruct the jury to compare the plaintiff's negligence with that of the
only in-court defendant when another driver was also causally negligent. See also
Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976); Pierringer v.
Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
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must be considered when the jury apportions the causal negli-
gence of the parties.110 This is done so that a more accurate and
representative apportionment can be made as to all parties
already joined. Even parties who are legally immune from lia-
bility must be considered in the jury's determination.
The problem which May poses here is best exemplified in
the situation where an employer is primarily responsible for an
employee's injury. In a typical case of this sort an employee is
injured during the course of his employment while using a
product manufactured by a third party. The employee receives
worker's compensation and begins suit against the manufac-
turer of the product."' The third party action is based on prod-
ucts liability and the employer is included in the special ver-
dict so that its negligence may be considered by the jury. Under
the individual comparison rule, if the manufacturer's negli-
gence is found to be less than that of the plaintiff, the manufac-
turer is exonerated from all liability. This is because the com-
parative negligence statute allows a recovery only where the
plaintiff's negligence does not exceed that of the party against
whom recovery is sought. In any event, the employer would be
dismissed because, as between the employer and employee,
worker's compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy." 2
Under a combined comparison rule, if a jury returns a ver-
dict which reads: plaintiff 10%, employer 85% and manufac-
turer 5%, the plaintiff would be able to combine the negligence
of the employer with the negligence of the manufacturer to
establish the manufacturer's liability. Once liability was so
established, plaintiff could then rely on joint and several lia-
bilty to recover the full 90% of his damages. This, of course,
seems grossly unfair to the manufacturer. To add salt to the
wounds, the manufacturer would be unable to seek contribu-
tion from the employer"' and might in fact have to reimburse
the employer for any worker's compensation benefits already
paid or payable to the plaintiff. A combined comparison rule,
applied in the absence of changes in the rules of joint and
several liability, would allow the burden of the negligent em-
110. Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1975) specifically provides for third party actions by
employees.
111. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1975).
112. Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957).
113. Such a problem exists where the manufacturer's negligence exceeds that of the
employee but remains less than that of the employer.
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ployer to be cast upon a party less negligent than the plaintiff.
Although a form of this problem predated May, this example
best exemplifies the heightened unfairness of the May rule
which was nominally adopted to prevent "harsh and unfair
results." This unfairness could be recitifed by altering the rules
of joint and several liability as previously discussed. Namely,
if the manufacturer were liable for only that percentage of cau-
sal negligence attributed to it, it would lack any grounds for
complaint. In essence the manufacturer would only be liable
for the damage it in fact caused. Such a result is in accord with
the underpinnings of comparative negligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed in section III, the adoption of a combined com-
parison rule would not only affect the simple situation envi-
sioned in May, but would also have ramifications throughout
the entire body of tort-related law. In order to assure the most
consistent and equitable results possible under a combined
comparison rule, significant changes would need to be made in
related areas. The necessity of these changes is an additional
argument for adoption of a combined comparison rule by the
legislature rather than the court since the legislature could at
the same time develop a consistent statutory scheme affecting
these related areas. This advantage of legislative as opposed to
court adoption of such a rule, together with the constitutional
problems regarding judicial adoption raised in section II,
strongly support forbearance by the court in implementing the
change in the rule of individual comparison envisioned in May.
JOHN A. ROTHSTEIN
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